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LANGUAGE ACCULTURATION PROCESSES
AND RESISTANCE TO
IN"DOCTRINE"ATION IN THE LEGAL
SKILLS CURRICULUM AND BEYOND:
A COMMENTARY ON MERTZ'S CRITICAL
ANTHROPOLOGY OF THE SOCRATIC,
DOCTRINAL CLASSROOM
BROOK

K. BAKER*

INTRODUCTION

Elizabeth Mertz has brought a sophisticated outsider's
perspective, that of an anthropologist, to the legal classroom, a
place she once rented as a student and now inhabits as a
professor.'
Via tape recordings, transcriptions, and linguistic
analyses, she explores the role of classroom discourse in the
process of language acculturation. This process takes people with
perfectly normal moral sensitivities and transforms them into
legal technocrats who use the sterile language of law to solve legal
disputes while obscuring the mechanisms of power that animate
legal rules and channel legal decisions. To investigate this process
of acculturation to textual authority, Mertz interrogates both the
deep structures of classroom discourse and the patterns of class
participation that erase context, disrupt narrative forms, and
eviscerate moral sensibilities and cultural perspectives.
To
achieve a faqade of formal rationality, the legal educational system
trains lawyers, according to Mertz, to participate in a discourse
that selects and abstracts salient facts according to the
imperatives of legal categories. However, in so selecting, this legal
discourse robs legal disputants and legal trainees of the narrative,
social, and ethical factors that animate moral discourse about

Professor of Law, Northeastern University School of Law. I would like
to thank The John Marshall Law School for inviting me to participate in its
conference "The Languages of Race, Feminism, Philosophy and Anthropology:
Translating for the Legal Skills Classroom" and my fellow panel members,
Elizabeth Mertz and Susan Hirsch.
1. Elizabeth Mertz, Teaching Lawyers the Language of Law: Legal and
Anthropological Translations,34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 91 (2000).
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social disputes and systematic oppression in the "real world." In
particular, she finds that Socratic dialogue, a form of guided
in"doctrine"ation, reproduces the categorical imperatives of the
law by placing parties in particularized but denatured social
positions and by making certain, legally relevant facts pivotal.
This in"doctrine"ation renders the local setting of the dispute, the
life histories of the disputants, and the cultural perspectives of the
parties (and students) legally irrelevant. Law students must then
compare these denaturalized caricatures of life against the
definitional matrices of statutes or the skeletal forms of past
disputes, which implicitly, according to the standard account,
suggest a legally proper outcome.
In these categorical and
analogical processes, equity succumbs to law, life to text. In
Mertz's account, learning to think, read, and talk like a lawyer
means more than learning to think, read, and talk about the law.
It means casting off one's moral compass, shutting down one's
empathetic response, and putting grander concerns about social
and political justice aside in favor of satisfying the surface
requirements of formal rationality. "When viewed through this
lens, traditional legal pedagogy symbolically mirrors and
reinforces an epistemology that is vital to the legal system's
legitimacy."'
Mertz examines legal discourse through an uncommonly close
analysis of the words actually spoken within the classroom (an
unflattering report of law professors' collective incoherence),
listening for what is deselected as well as what is selected-silence
as well as speech. Instead of looking to written accounts of the law
for evidence of a canon of doctrinal rationality, she focuses on firstyear contracts classes where the epistemological rites of passage
are particularly poignant. Here, legal pedagogy subjects the naive
readings and worldviews of students to a ritual of ridicule and
reorientation.' This pedagogy replaces an attention to the drama
of people embroiled in an embedded dispute with an attention to
the requirements of law-to offer and acceptance, breach, and
other sediments of legal doctrine. "Instead of putting priority on
the content of the 'conflict stories' told in legal texts, law professors
urge their students to analyze how the texts point to (or 'index')
authority."4
When storied accounts of misfortune trigger
emotional responses or when tales of injustice resonate with moral

2. Id. at 94. Of course, many other commentators from the legal realist
movement to the present have noted the reliance on doctrine to teach students
to "think like a lawyer." See, e.g., Kurt Saunders & Linda Levine, Learning to
Think Like a Lawyer, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 121 (1994).
3. Mertz emphasizes how frequently professors violate norms of polite
speech to interrupt students and to ignore or fail to "uptake" the content of
their classroom responses. Mertz, supra note 1, at 102-03.

4. Id. at 100.
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commitments, legal novices learn to relegate these unsophisticated
responses to the margin through express disavowal or doctrinal
refocus.' Thus, the typical first-year classroom creates a discipline
of the material and the immaterial; this discipline trains the
student away from empathy, moral outrage, and social justice
concerns and, in Mertz's account, refocuses the student toward the
rule of law absolutism and toward instrumental relativism.
Mertz observes two conventional forms of legal reasoning
revealed by linguistic analysis, namely: (1) rule-based reasoning
that rests strongly on statutory language and legal rules contained
in previously decided cases and (2) analogical reasoning that
compares legally the salient fact patterns from prior cases against
the reconstructed factual matrix of the problem case.6 Mertz
primarily describes the anthropological violence of legal language
in the rule-based paradigm, noting how legal language damages
the narrative and contextual structures that might otherwise
animate ethical discourse about social conflict.7 In the case of rulebased analysis, she notes how the concrete particulars of past
disputes are abstracted to such a high degree that the underlying
dispute loses its humanity and complexity, replaced instead by
categorical certitudes and legal edifices that create a false aura of
inevitability.8 In addition, reliance on the abstract authority of
legal rules not only hides the social power of those most
advantaged by the existing legal order, it also hides the
discretionary choices of encultured social actors who articulate
such formalities in the first place and who perpetuate them within
a socially conservative, under-reflective tradition of doctrinal
continuity, ignoring the interactive effects of latent political and
moral commitments.9
Such anthropological violence also exists in the case of
analogical reasoning. Although Mertz pays less attention to this
form of reasoning, she detects a primary source of narrative
dislocation, and I detect two additional kinds of deformation that
legal "analogies" impose on the narrative structure of the original
dispute. First, according to Mertz, analogical reasoning picks

5. Id. at 101. See also Marjorie A. Silver, Love, Hate, and Other Emotional
Interference in the Lawyer/Client Relationship, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 259, 278-

79 (1999) (discussing how lawyers are trained to resist emotional awareness
and how the Socratic method introduces and disciplines that avoidance).
6. See Mertz supra, note 1, at 92. See, e.g., Scott Brewer, "Exemplary
Reasoning": Semantics, Pragmatics,and the Rational Force of Legal Argument
by Analogy, 109 HARV. L. REV. 923 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, Commentary on
Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741 (1993).
7. Mertz, supra note 1, at 104-05.
8. Id. at 107-08.
9. See Karl E. Kare, Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism,
14 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 146, 159 (1998) (maintaining that rule choices
constitute a compromise between legal authority and ideological projects).
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apart the client narrative to select only those facts that relate to
pre-established legal imperatives contained in the master-stories
of law. Thus, this method of reasoning erases many contextual
and embodied human traces of the conflict.' ° Second, analogical
reasoning reformulates relatively concrete facts at higher levels
of abstraction in order to provide a meaningful comparison to
"analogous" facts in previously decided cases. Thus, in order to
achieve this level of commensurability, legal analogy sacrifices the
detailed particulars of a socially situated narrative. Third, the
general
process of comparison-looking for similarities,
dissimilarities, and gaps-disrupts what small amount of
phenomenological narrative coherence remains in a case. Because
legal analogies are "made" not found, in manufacturing
comparisons, lawyers further deform the case at bar. The legal
viability of the underlying conflict in each story-the core meaning
of a case-ultimately rests not on its own merits or equities but,
rather, on its comparisons and distinctions with previous
exemplars.
Mertz's anthropological insights extend beyond noticing the
formalism of indoctrination into legal discourse and how that
process removes the contextual, narrative, and emotive features
from both the disputes themselves and the classroom discussions.
She also notices how Socratic discourse places students in fixed
social positions, usually in disputant roles, in order to articulate
competing legal arguments." These arguments are expected to
flow naturally from the abstract social position disciplined only by
the language of law." Although Mertz notices this phenomenon
and notes how it reinforces the alleged "objectivity" and authority
of law, she does not pay as much attention to the amorality of
arbitrary assignments to such roles and the consequences of being
asked repeatedly to change roles. In other words, in addition to
being formalistic and authority-based, the traditional first-year
classroom, simultaneously, is also consistently adversarial,
normatively relativistic, and amorally multi-variant. 3 Professors

10. Mertz describes a process in which "key facts" are selected and become
key only because they become "token instances of legal types." Mertz, supra
note 1, at 105. "[T]his apparent concern for specificity wrenches detail from its

particular social and narrative context in ways that can obscure or erase the
features of the story that lay people look to when effectuating moral
judgments...." Id.
11. Id. at 108. "[T]he law student's [refocused] vision locates people in
conflict in terms of categories that place them in defined argumentative
positions." Id.
12. "Thus, students are placed in the shoes of people occupying legal

'positions,' located in landscapes whose key referents are legal requirements."
Id. at 109.

13. For a discussion of how the ordinary religion of the classroom includes
skepticism about legal rules, instrumental manipulation of doctrine and
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do not ask students how party A might see her interests and social
needs as congruent with party B's. Professors do not ask students
to imagine how society might intervene to help mediate multivalue dispute resolution. Professors do not ask students how
perspectives on race, gender, and class underlie the dispute and
how alternative visions of social justice might inform decisionmaking. Instead, professors ask students to enter into a binary
system of verbal combat where each legal argument is matched by
Still more
a nearly equal and opposite counter-argument.
pernicious, instructors assign students to argumentative roles
without reference to personal morality, and then paradoxically-in
order to demonstrate true professional neutrality-students must
often make the opposing argument as well. Thus, law students
learn to switch allegiances easily, to be voice boxes, word
processors, or verbal combatants for hire. They learn to be
indifferent about client selection and unmoved by client ends, so
long as such ends are lawful. Thus, Mertz acknowledges that
lawyers come to believe or, at least, speak and write as if the law
is so loaded with unquestioned authority or is so fair, neutral, and
objective in its application that the lawyer needs no personal,
moral relationship to the dispute or to the arguments that
positional necessity might "require" them to advance. At the same
time, however, I believe that the legal educational system trains
them in a form of intra-psychic, nihilistic neutrality, where
everything is argument and counter-argument, where suspending
solidarity is a virtue, and where no normative value is at stake in
deciding (or not deciding) who to represent and what "legal" goals
to pursue. 4 The neutrality valued in the Socratic classroom is
personal, doctrinal, and decisional. Rather than use a felt or
experiential connection to social dispute, students are encouraged
to develop a more "professional" detachment and to deny anything
but an intellectual and doctrinal connection; however, even this
analytical connection is distant and Olympian.
At a higher level of abstraction, Mertz compellingly equates
the role of money as a neutral medium of exchange in the unequal
global economy with the role of law as an allegedly neutral
precedent, and deployment of formal linear logic all in the service of
Machiavellian ends, see Roger C. Cramton, The Ordinary Religion of the Law
School Classroom, 29 J. LEGAL EDUC. 247, 248 (1978).
14. See, e.g., James R. Elkins, Thinking Like a Lawyer: Second Thoughts,
47 MERCER L. REV. 511 (1996) (discussing the amoral, instrumentalist nature
of "thinking like a lawyer"). The development of detachment and distance are
key attributes of the process of professionalization in general and legal
professionalization in particular. See Eric Margolis & Mary Romero, "The
Department is Very Male, Very White, Very Old, and Very Conservative": The
Functioningof the Hidden Curriculum in Graduate Sociology Departments, 38
,HARv. EDUC. REV. 1, 9, 14 (1998) (examining the "hidden curriculum" on
women of color graduate students in sociology).
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medium of exchange "across all areas and levels of society" despite
systematic inequality. 5 "In converting virtually every event or
conflict into a shared rhetoric [of formal equality], legal language
generates an appearance of neutrality that belies its often deeplyskewed institutional workings."' 6 The false certainty of law, its
facial neutrality, and its linear logic all combine to obscure
privilege and power in the real world. Instead of race and other
systems of oppression being salient, even central, in many
disputes, the form and content of legal language promises that
race will not matter because the law will serve as a neutral
medium of exchange that will flatten power differentials. 7 Legal
training replaces the law student's previous ability to discern
contextual guideposts and perceive pervasive patterns of
discrimination in moral disputes with what Mertz calls "cultural
invisibility." 8
This "invisibilization" of power, privilege, and
cultural advantage (and the correlative invisibilization of
subordination, oppression, and stigmatization) is the hidden
curriculum of professional training, a training that simultaneously
reproduces and camouflages the dominant social order." Just as
the dominant culture naturalizes white privilege and black
subordination as the "way things are"-unremarkable and
unremarked, suspect only by a strong act of critical
consciousness-the legal culture also naturalizes them. ° Although
Mertz acknowledges that the disadvantaged may occasionally
rights talk and/or from doctrinal and decisional neutrality,' she

15. Mertz, supra note 1, 102.

16. Id. at 103.
17. See id. at 110. "[T]his removed approach to people and human conflict
feeds into an ideology of universal translatability in which legal language
serves as a discursive medium of exchange across all areas and levels of
society." Id.
18. Id. at 113.
19. See Margolis & Romero, supra note 14, at 3 (describing the strong form
of a hidden curriculum as the part that reproduces stratified social relations).
20. See, e.g., BARBARA FLAGG, WAS BLIND, BUT Now I SEE: WHITE RACE
CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE LAW (1998); ROBERT L. HAYMAN, JR., THE SMART
CULTURE: SOCIETY, INTELLIGENCE, AND LAW (1998); STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN,
PRIVILEGE REVEALED: How INVISIBLE PREFERENCE UNDERMINES AMERICA

(1996);

PEGGY MCINTOSH,

WHITE PRIVILEGE

AND MALE PRIVILEGE:

A

PERSONAL ACCOUNT OF COMING TO SEE CORRESPONDENCES THROUGH WORK

IN WOMEN'S STUDIES (Wellesley C. Center For Res. on Women Working Paper
No. 189, 1988).

21. Mertz, supra note 1, at 114. See generally Eric Blumenson, Mapping
the Limits of Skepticism in Law and Morals, 74 TEx. L. REV. 523 (1996)
(discussing the relevance of universal human rights principles in moral
dialogue about just outcomes); Kimberld Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform,
and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Anti-Discrimination
Law, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1331 (1988) (discussing the importance of exposing
the racist nature of ostensibly neutral norms and devising strategies that

include the pragmatic use of legal rights).
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maintains:
On the other hand, erasing many of the concrete social and
contextual features can direct attention away from grounded moral
understandings that some see as crucial to achieving justice.
Moreover, the abstraction and alienation provides the law with a
"cloak" of apparent neutrality, which conceals the ways in which law
participates in and supports unjust aspects of capitalist societies. 22
Law professors, acting as vigilant guardians of the
established legal order, patrol the "borders" of these patterns of
permissible and impermissible subjects, these privileged forms of
rule-based and analogical reasoning, and these indifferences to
positional argumentation and assertions of misleading neutrality.23
Moreover, the voices actually heard and silenced in the classroom
also reproduce these patterns, forms, and indifferences. It comes
as no surprise to any observer of the patterns of participation in
the legal classroom that middle-class, able-bodied, deep-voiced
white males feel more freedom to speak than previously excluded
groups of women, gays and lesbians, and students-of-color. 4
Persons who are more powerful in the dominant social order often
feel more privileged to speak. Part of their social power is their
reflexive, unexamined ease of dialogic (or monologic) participation.
They slip and slide into and out of conversations via blunt
interruptions or diplomatic appropriation of the stage in order to
vie for status by speaking confidently in the "tribal tongue"25 that
is but a refinement of their birthright. Mertz describes these
voices as the "kinds of voices [that] can
actually speak in this
26
decontextualized language of the law [.],,
Outsiders, on the other hand, have a triple border to pass.
First, they must circumvent the implicit dialogic pecking order
that would have them speak last and briefly, if at all. Along with
22. Mertz, supra note 1, at 114.
23. Id. at 107. Although I agree that Mertz captures one aspect of the
doctrinal classroom, she fails to explore instances when doctrinal teachers
emphasize the indeterminacy and incoherence of legal doctrine and when they
bring extra-judicial factors to bear in discussing the merits of legal decisions.
In my experience, most law professors, especially, perhaps, at my law school,
are legal realists and their progeny. They frequently (but perhaps not
frequently enough) offer critical perspectives on the doctrine they are
"covering" in their first-year classes. Although doctrine may constitute the
"core" experience of these classrooms, there are alternative perspectives at the
periphery.
24. See Elizabeth Mertz et al., What Difference Does Difference Make? The
Challenge for Legal Education, 48 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1998) (reporting data on
class participation in eight semester-long Contracts classes and noting
contextual complexity and patterns of reduced participation by women and
minorities).
25. Teresa Godwin Phelps, The New Legal Rhetoric, 40 Sw. L.J. 1089, 1102
(1986)
26. Mertz, supra note 1, at 114.
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the insider professor, who, as a community elder and role model,
polices this participation queue, the other discourse partners
facilitate or impede outsider participation with verbal elbows and
lip-checks."
Of course, self-silencing also occurs because of
internalized oppression-the self-doubting feeling that one has
nothing of value to offer or that one will embarrass one's group by
substandard performance.28
Second, legal pedagogy expects outsiders to learn a dialect
and a register, a form of reasoning and speaking, which is far
different from their natural or home language. For example, if the
home language of women is frequently a language of reciprocity
and relation,29 then learning a new language of objectivity, rights,
and confrontation presents special risks of speaking inartfully,
which in turn saps the outsider's will to participate. 0 Thus, many
outsiders stay near the margin and eavesdrop on the classroom
conversation because they might not otherwise learn the cadence
and etiquette-let alone the content rules-of the discourse. 1
Third, because those favored by law and by the language of
law have marginalized, stigmatized, and colonized outsiders and
their communities, speaking in this new language of power is a

27. See, e.g., DEBORAH TANNEN, YOU JUST DON'T UNDERSTAND: WOMEN
AND MEN IN CONVERSATION (1990) (discussing male-gendered communicative
strategies and men's tendency toward competition).
28. The risks of self-censorship are particularly acute if outsider law
students feel the risk of stereotyping-that they and the groups to which they
belong are being judged or assessed according to socially primed negative
expectations. This risk, imposed by the outside world as a persistent form of
racial stigmatization (for example), saps outsider students' energy,
compromises their actual performance in law talk, and/or leads to
involuntarily silence, a form of self-censorship and alienation that is all the
more problematic because it feels like it is internally generated. Claude
Steele, Thin Ice: "Stereotype Threat" and Black College Students, THE
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Aug. 1999, at 44.

29. For a discussion at the forefront of delineating a feminist ethic of
relationship, interdependence, cooperation, and care, see CAROL GILLIGAN, IN
A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT

(1982). See also TANNEN, supra note 27. For a discussion of the feminist ethic
in the legal context, see, e.g., Ruth Colker, Feminist Litigation: An
Oxymoron?-A Study of the Briefs Filed in William L. Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services, 13 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 137 (1990); Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Women's Lawyering Process, 1
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39, 44-49 (1985) (describing the use of a feminist
ethic of care as a style of lawyering).
30. See Kathryn M. Stanchi, Resistance is Futile: How Legal Writing
Pedagogy Contributes to the Law's Marginalization of Outsider Voices, 103
DICK. L. REV. 7, 41-51 (1998) (citing Sandra Janoff, The Influence of Legal
Education on Moral Reasoning, 76 MINN. L. REV. 193, among other sources).
31. See Mertz et al., supra note 24, at 33-36 tbls.1-4 (reporting previous
studies of women's participation and alienation in the classroom), 45-61
(reporting results of their own study including higher non-participation rates
in Socratic classrooms).
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form of self and community betrayal and creates conscious and
unconscious resistance to the process of socialization. 2 Outsiders
certainly notice and frequently seethe at contextual disavowals in
the classroom. Examples include the erasure of race in a case
involving a great-white-hope boxing match33 and the discussion of
implied consent in rape cases. Contributing to this artificial
silence by talking around the issues of race or gender can deeply
debilitate students-of-color and female students.
Thus, the
prospect of joining the discourse and talking like a lawyer-not
about race and not about gender-creates an internal
psychological phenomenon of border resistance.34
At the same time, learning the language of the law often
requires outsider students to incorporate negative images and
stereotypes about their communities of origin. Thus, when the
legal language does not ignore outsiders, it frequently slanders
them instead.35 Rather than being sucked into or walking boldly
into the belly of the beast, the Law incarnate, outsider students
32. See, e.g., Frances Lee Ansley, Race and the Core Curriculum in Legal
Education, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1511 (1991); Janice L. Austin et al., Results from a
Survey: Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Students' Attitudes About Law School, 48
J. LEGAL EDUC. 157 (1998); Taunya Lovell Banks, Gender Bias in the
Classroom, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 137 (1988); Charles Calleros, Training a
Diverse Student Body for a Multicultural Society, 8 LA RAZA L.J. 140 (1995);
Kimberl Crenshaw, Foreword: Toward a Race-Conscious Pedagogy in Legal
Education, 11 NAVL BLACK L.J. 1, 3-6 (1989) (discussing objectification); Lani
Guinier et al., Becoming Gentlemen: Women's Experiences at One Ivy League
Law School, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1994); Paula Lustbader, Teach In Context:
Responding to Diverse Student Voices Helps All Students Learn, 48 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 402, 404 (1998) (discussing alienation); Margaret Montoya, Voicing
Differences, 4 CLINICAL L. REV. 147 (1997); Stanchi supra note 30, at 37
(describing betrayal of personal mores); Catherine Weiss & Louise Melling,
Essay: The Education of Twenty Women, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1299 (1988).
33. Mertz, supra note 1, at 115-16.
34. See Stanchi, supra note 30, at 31-33, 34 (discussing Professor Montoya's
experience as a Latina, studying a case in which issues of race had been
effaced and citing Margaret E. Montoya, Maxcaras, Trenzas, Y Brenas:
Un/Masking the Self While Un/Braiding Latina Stories and Legal Discourse,
17 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1988)). Stanchi discusses another similar instance
in her own legal writing class where a student resisted writing about the
statute of limitations defense to recovered memories of child abuse. Id. at 3840. The student felt "that communicating, especially in writing, law and
reasoning that she considered not only fallacious but also harmful, gave
legitimacy to it." Id. at 39. Margolis and Romero talk about the common
experience of graduate students-of-color in sociology departments where the
curriculum artificially excludes and devalues authors-of-color both in assigned
readings and what is considered polite or professionally appropriate topics.
Margolis & Romero, supra note 14, at 19-24. They refer to these practices as
being problems of silence and exclusion. Id.
35. In a non-legal context, Margolis and Romero have noticed how
professionalization in sociology requires women-of-color to internalize negative
stereotypes and to internalize white, male, middle-class norms-a double-form
of alienation. Margolis and Romero, supra note 14, at 16-17.
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expend considerable psychic effort and cognitive resources fighting
their figurative emigration from their communicative homeland
and their dialogic immigration to the language of a powerful elite
who primarily serve the masters of the political economy. Instead
of capitulating to language apartheid, they resist; instead of
assimilating to the canon of doctrine, they pluralize.
I.

IMPLICATIONS OF ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES WITHIN
LEGAL WRITING PEDAGOGY

My invitation to this particular panel is premised on the
possibility that I have something to say not only about what Mertz
says, but also about whether what she says has any resonance in
the skills curriculum in law school, particularly the legal writing
curriculum. In short, it does in many ways. As a discipline, legal
writing specialists not only cooperate with the language
in"doctrine"ation Mertz describes, we teach it explicitly both with
our doctrinal research and writing assignments and with our selfreflective use of process and socio-cultural approaches to legal
writing. 6 However, at the margins, legal writing professors have
also begun to challenge unreflective socialization processes and
the uncritical reproduction of canonical discourse practices. 7 The
36. See, e.g., Jo Anne Durako et al., From Product to Process:Evolution of a
Legal Writing Program, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 719, 722 (1997) (discussing the
focus on the students' final output); Jessie C. Grearson, Teaching the
Transitions, 4 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 57, 61-67 (1998); Phelps, supra note 25;
Jill J. Ramsfield, Is "Logic" Culturally Biased: A Contrastive, International
Approach to the U.S. Law Classroom, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 157 (1997)
(discussing cross-cultural perspectives on logic and persuasion); J. Christopher
Rideout & Jill J. Ramsfield, Legal Writing: A Revised View, 69 WASH. L. REV.
35 (1994); Joseph Williams, On the Maturing of Legal Writers: Two Models of
Growth and Development, 1 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 1 (1991).
37. A growing number of legal writing specialists urge that legal writing
pedagogy develop a more critical edge.
See, e.g., Brook K. Baker,
Transcending Legacies of Literacy and Transforming the Traditional
Repertoire: Critical Discourse Strategies for Practice, 23 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 491 (1997) [hereinafter Transforming the Traditional Repertoire]; Beth
Britt et al., Extending the Boundaries of Rhetoric in Legal Writing Pedagogy,
10 J. BUS. & TECH. CoMM. 213 (1996); Calleros, supra note 32; Lisa Eichhorn,
Writing in the Legal Academy: A DangerousSupplement?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 105
(1998); Elizabeth Fajans & Mary R. Falk, Against the Tyranny of Paraphrase:
Talking Back to Texts, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 163 (1993); Grearson, supra note
36, at 71-72; Douglas Litowitz, Legal Writing: Its Nature, Limits, and Dangers,
49 MERCER L. REV. 709 (1998); Carol McCrehan Parker, Writing Throughout
the Curriculum: Why Law Schools Need It and How to Achieve It, 76 NEB. L.
REV. 561, 597 (1997) (discussing why students should have the opportunity to
formulate and express original ideas concerning issues of importance to the
students and to society); Diana Pratt, RepresentingNon-Mainstream Clients to
Mainstream Judges: A Challenge of Persuasion,4 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 79
(1998); Lorne Sossin, Discourse Politics: Legal Research and Writing's Search
for a Pedagogy of Its Own, 29 NEw ENG. L. REV. 883 (1995); Stanchi, supra
note 30.
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good news is that some of Mertz's concerns about the narrowness
and formalism of doctrinal pedagogy are counteracted in the legal
writing classroom; the bad news is that writing instructors do not
do nearly enough to train our students to be transformative in
their approach to the law.
As confirmation of Mertz's observation about language
acculturation, legal writing specialists note, correctly I think, that
practice communities inevitably have their own distinctive
discourse practices, and processes of acculturation and law is no
exception.
As Mertz would surely admit, every specialized
discourse community adopts a plastic core of discourse conventions
that embody the forms of analysis, evidence, and argument that
"count." Although there is variation, pluralism, and contestation
within a discourse community about styles of communicative
practice and although these conventions mutate over time, a
discourse community will invariably recognize and accept certain
forms of discourse to be legitimate while rejecting other forms. To
make legal decisions, give legal advice, and participate in legal
dialogue, new community members need to know what kinds of
evidence and argument currently count. In the legal discourse
community, what counts, in substantial part, is the social
authority embedded in texts. In other communities, like the
scientific community, authoritative evidence and argumentation
might consist of experiments and accompanying explanatory
theories. In basketball (hardly a discourse community), evidence
is performative; it consists of picks and rolls, team defense and
blocked shots, rebounds and outlet passes, alley-oops and fadeaway jumpers.
Although all commentators seem to agree that reliance on
textual sources is at the heart of the legal impulse, many
important disputes exist concerning the nature of the
interpretative dilemma. The more traditional accounts maintain
that the legal community interprets texts purposefully, "logically,"
and formalistically, using plain meaning and legislative/judicial
intent heuristics; lawyers then apply such interpretations
deductively, inductively, abductively, and analogically to resolve
present dilemmas. 8 Alternative accounts of legal interpretation
emphasize widespread use of narrative heuristics in legal decisionmaking, even by legally trained decision-makers, though those
interpretations tend to cluster around the stock stories and the

38. See Scott Brewer, Logic in the Intellectual Kingdom of Law: Rethroning
Deduction, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 9, 10-11 (2000) (arguing for more and
better use of deductive reasoning in law); Dan Hunter, No Wilderness of Single
Instances: Inductive Inference in Law, 48 J. LEGAL EDUC. 365, 384 (1998)

(championing inductive reasoning and classifying abduction as a "qualitative
form of inductive reasoning"); Anita Schnee, Logical Reasoning: "Obviously," 3
J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 105, (1997) (discussing induction).
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master-narratives of law. 9 The decision maker, under such
alternative accounts, assesses narrative plausibility and decision
criteria in order to make a decision, basing his or her degree of
confidence in story "selection" on coherence, coverage, and
uniqueness.
In contrast, more "critical" accounts of interpretation
emphasize textual indeterminacy and focus on the conscious and
unconscious seepage of moral and political projects into -the
practice of legal interpretation. Certainly, proponents of the
critical legal studies, critical race, and critical feminism
movements argue that deployment of textual authority places a
patina of rationality and principle to socially motivated, resultdriven decisions. Like the legal realists before them, they argue
that traditional legal argumentation is almost exclusively
justificatory and that it applies easily discerned but normatively
deceptive conventions of argumentation. 4' They argue instead,
that lawyers and legal decision-makers should recognize their
interpretive authority and the impact of their moral, political, and
cultural perspectives; moreover, legal decision makers must
answer to the social consequences of their practice, whatever form
it may take. 4' However, even if this more critical description of
interpretation is the most accurate and even if more transparent,
principled forms of political and moral judgment should be applied
to legal decision-making, law schools will necessarily continue to
socialize their students to the centrality of textual authority in a
legal work.
If humans are to coordinate speech and action within the
behavior settings of resilient, yet settled, social institutions, 2 then
it is difficult to imagine that they would not develop conventions of
proof, argumentation, and justification that allow them to
participate and communicate meaningfully, even if they pursue
change. They will need to speak within the discipline and about
39. See, e.g., Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, The Story Model for Juror
Decision Making, in INSIDE THE JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUROR DECISION

MAKING 192 (Reid Hastie ed., 1993); Jane Larson, "A Good Story" and "The
Real Story," 34 J.

MARSHALL L. REV.

161 (2000); Gerald Lopez, Lay

Lawyering, 32 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1 (1984) (discussing "stock stories"); Steven L.
Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agony Between Legal Power and
Narrative Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2225 (1989) (discussing idealized
cognitive models including those with narrative form).
40. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Strategizing Strategic Behavior in Legal
Interpretation, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 785 (1996); Duncan Kennedy, Semiotics of
Legal Argument, 42 SYRACUSE L. REV. 75 (1991).
41. See, e.g., Klare, supra note 9, at 156-72.
42. For a brief discussion of "behavior settings," local contexts that have

routinized discourse and behavioral protocols, see Brook K. Baker, Beyond
MacCrate: The Role of Context, Experience, Theory, and Reflection in
Ecological Learning, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 287, 319 n.123 (1994) [hereinafter
Beyond MacCrate].
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the discipline in order to perform appropriate tasks, to signal
membership, and to challenge conventional approaches with more
transformative ones.
Nonetheless, although the discipline
psychologically, cognitively, and culturally constrains their
interpretive activities, communicative practices, and adjudicatory
decisions,43 lawyers and judges can also push at the borders, but
only if those borders are acknowledged, revealed, and questioned.
Therefore, law students, like novices in any other discourse
community, must learn the language of the realm in order to
meaningfully participate in the activities and discussions that
instantiate their socialization.
If a basketball player starts
throwing a basketball at the rim as though it were a baseball, then
the basketball coach needs to redirect the player's shooting
strategies to more appropriate performance criteria. Similarly, if
the law student's argument starts skipping into pure
ethnography" or pure narrative,45 the legal writing coach will
redirect the novice's attention toward relevant sources of legal
authority, at least as a reference point.
Doctrine, even
indeterminate doctrine, is a necessary part, perhaps even a
predominant part, of the interpretive, argumentative, and
justificatory practice of legal discourse. Thus, doctrine must play
an important role in the socialization process at law school. At the
same time, as discussed below, legal writing specialists can do
much more to reveal the conscious and unconscious contours of
constraint and to urge a more critical practice of interpretation,
argumentation, and adjudication.
Legal writing specialists believe novices' socialization to
doctrine to be so important that they tend to be more explicit
about it than other first-year teachers. However, legal writing
pedagogy is not a locus of Socratic dialogue, though some legal
writing commentators urge that it be one." Nor is it currently a
laboratory in formal rhetoric or formal logic, though others suggest
it.4" Instead, it is a classroom that typically trains law students to
understand the forms and content of traditional legal discourse not
by questions but by didactic instruction and recursive practice.
We legal writing professors also police the borders of permissible
43. Klare, supra note 9, at 160-61.
44. Regina Austin, Contextual Analysis, Race Discrimination, and Fast
Food, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV 207 (2000).
45. Jane B. Baron, Language Matters, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 163, 158
n.17 (2000).
46. Mary Kate Kearney & Mary Beth Beasley, Teaching Students How to
"Think Like A Lawyer": IntegratingSocratic Method with the Writing Process,
64 TEMP. L. REV. 885 (1991); Richard Neumann, A Preliminary Inquiry into
the Art of Critique,40 HASTINGS L.J. 725 (1989).
47. See, e.g., Linda Levine & Kurt M. Saunders, Thinking Like a Rhetor, 43
J. LEGAL EDUC. 108 (1993); Kurt M. Saunders, Law As Rhetoric, Rhetoric as
Argument, 44 J. LEGAL EDUC. 566 (1994); Brewer, supra note 38, at 46-47.

The John MarshallLaw Review

[34:131

and impermissible discourse-the borders of persuasive and
unpersuasive argumentation-but we do so by explicit, rather
than implicit, instruction in the conventions of the legal discourse
community.
We are typically explicit about assessing the
rhetorical context, about the problem-solving and strategic
purposes of legal writing, and about the forms of factual, legal, and
policy-based arguments that might persuade or inform other legal
audiences. We are every bit as doctrinal as the Contracts teachers
Mertz describes because we also emphasize case analysis, rule
synthesis, and doctrinal clarity. We instruct students in the
doctrine-of-the-case, with some interpretive freedom around the
edges, but with great acquiescence to legal authority nonetheless.
However, we do not merely model a philosophy of doctrinal
authority through the form of our tasks, we describe it explicitly in
our classroom and require students to reproduce it with clarity,
using the insights of linguistics and other disciplines if
appropriate.48 If Mertz asked why we do this, we would answer:
"We are training law students, as we must, to meet the
expectations of legally trained readers."49 Thus, to meet these
expectations, we explicitly instruct students about the forms of
argumentation and proof that satisfy readers' pragmatic concerns
of coherence, comprehensibility, and plausibility. Similarly, we
explicitly address the advocate's need to authenticate her claims
and the judge's correlative need to justify her decisions by
reference to legal authority, precedent, and policy. We certainly
are explicit in telling students that judges cannot merely say: "I
48. See, e.g., Elizabeth Fajans & Mary R. Falk, Linguistics and the
Composition of Legal Documents: Border Crossing, 22 LEGAL STUD. F. 697

(1998).

According to Fajans and Falk, linguistics offers prescriptive tools

which "can help lawyers create documents that communicate with clarity,
force, and candor." Id. at 698. Linguists present three particularly useful foci
for studying, teaching, and improving legal composition: semantics (the
meaning of words independent of context), syntax (the set of rules used to
combine words and phrases into sentences), and pragmatics (the additional
meaning communicated via context and shared cultural understandings). Id.
at 701-02. When legal writing instructors and legal novices incorporate

lessons from the field of linguistics, they are better able to convey the intended
meaning and understand the conventions of legal discourse. Fajans and Falk
also warn, however, that linguistics offers cautionary tales that can help legal

writers "learn our limits:" "The slipperiness of meaning, the inevitability of
syntactic ambiguity, and the coercion inherent in seemingly innocuous
language practices offer hard truths as well as heuristics." Id. at 698. They
also mention that conversation maxims are "something of a danger to critical
thinking and writing." Id. at 727. For me, these caveats concern linguistics'
normative silence about substantive content, the importance of critical
perspectives, the inappropriateness of appeals to bias, and a overly unified
conception of law.

49. Stanchi observes how this "outer" focus towards audience expectation
intensifies language acculturation and the exclusion of outsider perspectives.
Stanchi, supra note 30, at 20-21; accord Eichhorn, supra note 37, at 134-35.

20001

A Commentary on Mertz's CriticalAnthropology

have been moved by your story-judgment for the plaintiff."
Thus, we teach the conventions of rule-based and analogical
reasoning previously discussed. We teach students how to frame
narrower and broader rules from the gloss and dross of legal
opinions where clarity and precision are often absent. ° In
addition, we teach students how to synthesize a defensible and
persuasive rule from a series of cases" and how to establish the
"proof' of the synthesized rule through case illustration.52 We
instruct students how to set forth the arguments addressing
whether or not a case satisfies the elements test, factors test, or
balancing test, which provides the analytical structure of the
rule. 3 Although it is certainly possible, indeed likely, that rulebased reasoning creates a false aura of inevitability, masks
contested social premises, and provides an impoverished account
of moral decision-making, it is difficult to imagine legal decisionmaking that does not rely on some degree of abstraction (beyond
the abstraction of language in and of itself).
The quibble with traditional liberal or conservative rule-based
reasoning is not so much that it uses rules and abstraction to
guide decisions, but rather, people disagree with many of the
underlying principles and values the law advances-market
efficiency, for example, is not the only value upon which the world
rotates. In contrast, some developing nations offer the hope of
advancing principled jurisprudence based on human values. For
example, the new South African Constitution, which contains
visionary human rights provisions in its Bill of Rights, will
hopefully animate the South African judiciary to decide cases
based on positive rights and human values. 4 Although South
African human rights provisions are significantly indeterminate
and ambiguous, although its provisions reflect competing values,
and although its interpretation necessarily reflects the extratextual legacies of apartheid, abstract principles like dignity,
equality, and children's best interests form a desirable and

50. See, e.g., LINDA H. EDWARDS, LEGAL WRITING: PROCESS, ANALYSIS, AND
ORGANIZATION 45-47 (2d ed. 1999); RICHARD K. NEUMANN, LEGAL REASONING
AND LEGAL WRITING: STRUCTURE, STRATEGY, AND STYLE 33-34, 40-41, 128-29
(3d ed. 1998). For a discussion of the abductive process in legal reasoning that
not only induces a generalization for a series of cases, but also provides a
warrant for justification, see Hunter, supra note 38, at 384-91.
51. STEVEN L. BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL REASONING
37, 44-48, 58-68 (1985); EDWARDS, supra note 50, at 64-65, 68-70; NEUMANN,
supra note 50, at 131-32; DEBORAH A. SCHMEDEMANN & CHRISTINA L. KUNZ,
SYNTHESIS: LEGAL READING, REASONING, AND WRITING 41-50 (1999); HELENE
S. SHAPO ET AL., WRITING AND ANALYSIS IN THE LAW 49-52 (4th ed. 1999).
52. See, e.g., NEUMANN, supra note 50, at 15-25, 89-102.
53. See, e.g., EDWARDS, supra note 50, at 20-23; SCHMEDEMANN & KUNZ,
supra note 51, at 13-17.
54. See, e.g., Kare, supra note 9.
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integral part of both human and judicial deliberation. 5
Similarly, analogical reasoning plays an important role in
legal discourse and adjudication, and legal writing instructors
teach such reasoning explicitly. 6 Stare decisis, deciding like cases
alike, is one of the principal ways that the legal past funds the
legal present. However, it also preserves the myths of legal
tradition and sacrifices reconsideration of present values and
immediate social conflict to the altar of precedent.57 But, the truth
is that there is no real alternative to this form of reasoning
because reasoning from exemplars is the prototypical cognitive
strategy for dealing with novel dilemmas.58 Moreover, there is no
"pure," uninterpreted human drama waiting to be discovered, even
by the client herself. Since all interpretation, legal and lay, in
socially constructed and iterative, interpretation of underlying
narratives and categorical rules is the result of human activity in
which multiple meanings await anyone but the most uni-focal
observer" and where meaning mutates over time. Legal analogies
may debilitate and deform the more original and authentic
accounts of the underlying human conflict, but it is hard to see
why legal analysts would not want to be guided, at least in part,
by the prior deliberations and vicarious exemplars of other legal
professionals.
In addition to being explicit about conventions of legal
rhetoric and analysis, legal writing pedagogy unabashedly
promotes the combative/hired gun amorality Mertz describes. We
assign students to argumentative positions with little or no
attention to students' preexisting moral commitments or life
experience. 60 We always exhort our students to use the convention
55. Id. See also Blumenson, supra note 21.
56. See, e.g., BURTON, supra note 51, at 27-40, 68-77, 140-42, 163-64;
EDWARDS, supra note 50, at 108-16; NEUMANN, supra note 50, at 130;
SCHMEDEMANN & KUNZ, supra note 51, at 91-96;
57. See Litowitz, supra note 37, at 723 (stating "[olbedience to tradition is

inevitable if one is to play the game of law, but lawyers tend to get trapped in
a hermeneutic circle that endlessly affirms the existing arrangement").
58. See Baker, Beyond MacCrate, supra note 42, at 310-13, 342-43
(discussing the implications of contextual perception, memory, and patterned
categorization).

59. Social

science

clearly

demonstrates

that,

to

achieve

cognitive

consistency, frequently people see or experience what they expect to see or

experience.

Id. at 311.

See also Kim Lane Scheppele, Foreword: Telling

Stories, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2073, 2090 (1989) (discussing how presuppositions,
conceptual schemata, and expectations influence perception).

60. A particularly painful example of this is described by Stanchi when a
student objected to being assigned to write about a statute of limitations
defense in a recovered memory case. See Stanchi, supra note 30, at 38-40.
One could wonder why we persist in forcing students to convert to "the
ordinary religion" of positional instrumentalism by asking them to continue

writing about positions they abhor. The possibility of adverse student reaction
arises most acutely the more "relevant," i.e., controversial, we make our
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of argument and counter-argument, to anticipate the other side's
legal position, and to respond in order to rebut, refute, or negate
it."' We emphasize that the client's best argument is one that both
anticipates and responds to the opponent's best argument. We too
urge our students to loosen their identification with a client
personally and positionally, to open their eyes to all the
arguments, and to take on the other client's perspective just as
easily as changing a pair of shoes. On the other hand, it is hard to
imagine lawyering without paying some heed to the other side or
without having the mental ability to switch perspectives fluidly. A
lawyer who sees only one side of the case, even a human rights
lawyer, certainly does his or her client a disservice. Nonetheless,
legal writing pedagogy remain unnecessarily complacent about the
ordinary religion of inter-positional amorality when we urge
students to evaluate the strength of legal arguments by flipflopping between exaggerated legal claims with no overarching
concern for social justice or the interests of absent parties.
Although we should certainly discourage myopia and encourage
expanded visions, we must also problematize the too easy
exchange of empathetic commitments that might otherwise
animate representation.
However, legal writing instructors' explicitness is an
important pedagogical step in revealing the invisible legal culture,
which the doctrinal classroom purposefully leaves latent, but we
must still do a better job unearthing assumptions and describing
prevailing conventions.6 2 The real question posed by Mertz to legal
writing specialists, however, is not whether we participate in the
doctrinal acculturation of our students or serve valid pedagogical
aims by revealing it, but whether we are willing to criticize its
misconceptions and self-deception, reform or transcend its flaws,
and transform its application. Although we could certainly do
much more to criticize that which we reveal, in answer to this
question, we have started to urge students to reflect more
consciously on that which was previously obscured in order to
transform legal discourse both inside and outside the classroom.

problems. Therefore, one of the difficulties of composing assignments that
address cutting edge issues of subordination is that students on the "wrong"
side might feel especially alienated and disempowered by their assigned role.
61. See Laura E. Little, Characterizationand Legal Discourse, 46 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 372, 377-80 (1996) (discussing the processes of destructive
characterization or direct negation as an argumentative strategy). Little notes
that constructive characterization models are often superior to destructive

ones since they "ask" decision-makers to reconceptualize a dispute on terms
favorable to an adversary rather than merely reject an opponent's argument.
Id. at 383-92.
62. See Ramsfield, supra note 36, at 157 (discussing the value of using a
contrastive approach to clarify even more directly the cultural conventions of
American legal literacy).
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To accomplish these goals, we have proposed: (1) placing legal
literacy within the context of other literacy traditions in the
United States, (2) recommending that students read legal texts
much more critically, (3) recommending that educators pluralize
the content of the classroom and facilitate participation by
outsiders, and (4) recommending experimentation with more
narrative, less biased, and more feminist discourse strategies and
with a collaborative ethic of client empowerment.
First, to contextualize Mertz's anthropological observation
that legal training teaches passivity towards legal authority (in
both senses) and emphasizes formal rationality and facial
neutrality of the law, some legal writing specialists place the
traditions of legal discourse within the broader traditions of
American literacy that reinforce this passivity.63 Legal literacy
valorizes coherence, closure, and unity at the expense of
ambiguity, openness, and multiplicity. 4 It also shrouds the
subject-the actual author of a legal text-behind a false veneer of
bureaucratic certainty."5 This epistemology of textual authority
and certainty in law is exemplary of a more encompassing literary
culture of allegiance to the printed word. 6 Under this more
pervasive regime, students are culturally predisposed leads to
over-rely on the written word, reported decisions, and statutory
language to resolve legal disputes. However, the language of legal
doctrine does not exist in a vacuum; it exists in a nested array of
complementary literary traditions that simply accept the assertion
of power and the silence of oppression in most textual forms.
Accordingly, students must not only overcome the legal culture of
textual dependency-the illusion that law is given, that law is
good, and that passive reading somehow discovers determinate
legal meaning. They must also overcome the underlying literacy
tradition. Only if they do so, hopefully with the encouragement of
legal educators, will students develop more critical perspectives on
the law and more transformative writing in practice.
Second, although many legal writing specialists are passive
towards law-thus evidencing an implicit jurisprudence of legal
positivism-others urge that students should read law critically. 7
63. See, e.g., Baker, Transforming the Traditional Repertoire, supra note
37, at 512.
64. See Kathleen McCormick, The Cultural Imperatives Underlying
Cognitive Acts, in READING-TO-WRITE: ExPLORING A COGNITIVE AND SOCIAL
PROCESS, SOCIAL AND COGNITIVE STUDIES IN WRITING AND LITERACY 194, 199
(1991).
65. See, e.g., Eichhorn, supra note 37, at 124-28, 133-35; Little, supra note
61, at 401; Stanchi, supra note 30, at 35-41.
66. McCormick, supra note 64, at 214-15; Fajans & Falk, supra note 37, at
173 (referring to the common-sense realist paradigm); Beth Britt et al., supra
note 37, at 214-15.

67. See sources cited supra note 37.
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For example, Kristin Woolever and her colleagues strongly advise
that students critically interpret legal text as human artifacts.6
They urge the use of critical interpretative strategies to
deconstruct legal text in order to uncover its assumptions,
privileges, and exclusions. "Critique, as a literacy skill, evidences
resistance to the dogmas of text and to the customs of
community-both in text interpretation and in text production."69
Deconstructionist critique draws on critical traditions, which
include critical legal studies, legal feminism, critical race theory,
and critical literary theory, to challenge the canon and conventions
of the rule of law and legal discourse.7" Once open to criticism,
however, the text's silences, gaps, and omissions are available for
analysis. By deconstructing the text, the critical reader locates the
author and information about the author's status, power, and
political interests. Using this analysis, students can see law as a
contingent social construct containing assumptions about the
world and reproducing a set of preferred power relationships. As
students criticize legal texts, they learn to question this power
structure by exploring and exploding master-stories of race,
gender, class, ability, age, sexual orientation-all the systems of
stereotype and oppression that plague our society.7' Through
critical readings, students awake to their own interpretive agency
and discover a potent power to transfigure the law in pursuit of
social justice.
Third, some of us, especially Charles Calleros and Kathryn
Stanchi, urge that the silence about outsiders be broken, that
professors pluralize the legal classroom, and that legal writing
instructors ensure that outsider students' life experiences,
perspectives, and voices be included in the classroom and in legal
discourse."2 Calleros, for example, recommends that legal writing
professors could do much more to include multicultural issues in
writing assignments. 3 Not only can we name parties with diverse
ethnic names,74 we can address issues of Native American law,
Chicano cultural traditions, and discrimination against people of
color, women, and gays."5 When we add multi-cultural issues to
the classroom, we encourage outsider students to become expert
witnesses about their own cultural practices." In the process of
68. Britt et al., supra note 37, at 213, 225-26.
69. Baker, Transforming the TraditionalRepertoire, supra note 37, at 512.

70. Id. at 513; Sossin, supra note 37.
71. Fajans & Falk, supra note 37, at 165; see Sossin, supra note 37, at 901.
72. Stanchi, supra note 30.
73. Calleros, supra note 32, at 150-56

74. Id. at 150-51.
75. Id. at 153-55.
76. Id. at 151-53; Brook K. Baker, Dilemmas of Cross-Cultural (and InnerCultural) Lawyering and Teaching: Six Months in South African Classrooms
and Clinics, 5-19 (1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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explaining traditions, students feel more ownership and less
alienation. They will collaborate to create a more inclusive and
trusting atmosphere of participation and exchange.
Stanchi, on the other hand, uses linguistics' "muting" theory,
to describe how outsider voices are systematically excluded from
the legal writing classroom because legal language does not
accurately convey experiences of subordination." Compared to the
doctrinal first-year class, the legal writing class, in one sense, is
undoubtedly more inclusive. Each student creates legal texts,
which she then continues to edit and revise. Additionally, each
student receives a significant portion of the instructor's time and
interacts with the instructor through written comments and
writing conferences. Moreover, many schools teach legal writing
in smaller sized classes. Some very small writing classes attempt
to create collaborative learning groups by employing teaching
assistants and adjunct professors.
Notwithstanding the
inclusivity of the legal writing classroom, Stanchi argues that legal
writing pedagogy asks outsiders to write in the inauthentic,
alienated, and disempowered forms mirrored from the doctrinal
classroom."8 To remedy this marginalization, Stanchi catalogues
ways to include outsider voices by both incorporating critical
outsider texts in the curriculum and fostering "expressive"
articulation of outsider voices in the classroom and in student's
writing."9
Similarly, Jessie Grearson suggests that legal writing
instructors make a heightened effort to recognize the experiences
law students gain while working in other discourse fields, and on
maturing in different cultural traditions. She discusses how
professors may facilitate transitions between discourse
communities more directly.
Grearson also observes that
emphasizing expressive orientations can help pluralize legal
discourse. °
Other commentators, particularly from the clinical context,
urge legal skills instructors to use difference explicitly in their
teaching as a way of improving legal understanding, fighting
discrimination, and enhancing client problem solving.8' One of the
77. Stanchi, supra note 30, at 19.
78. Id. at 20-51.
79. Id. at 51-57.
80. Grearson, supra note 36, at 73-78. Parker also focuses on the use of
more "expressive" orientations to permit students to find their own "voice" and
to develop their own values. Parker, supra note 37.
81. See, e.g., Beverly Balos, Learning to Teach Gender, Race, Class and
Heterosexism: Challenge in the Classroom and Clinic, 3 HASTINGS WOMEN'S
L.J. 161 (1992); Kathleen S. Bean, The Gender Gap in the Law School
Classroom-Beyond Survival, 14 VT. L. REV. 23 (1989); Richard Boldt & Mark
Feldman, The Faces of Law in Theory and Practice: Doctrine, Rhetoric and
Social Context, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1111 (1992); Leslie G. Espinoza, Legal
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complexities of using difference, however, is getting mainstream
students to understand worldviews and to understand the
narratives of people with radically different life experiences." A
second complexity of using difference as an instructional device is
learning to avoid putting outsider students on the spot as having
an obligation to represent their entire group.8" A third complexity
is avoiding a classroom culture of essentialism and/or stereotype in
which the class interprets the experiences of a particular
subordinated group member as uni-dimensional and immutable
rather than intersectional, contingent, and individualized.84
Fourth, some critics of legal writing pedagogy argue that it is
not enough to nurture critical literacy practices in the classroom.
Instead, the legal writing classroom must also prepare students
for critical discourse strategies under the constraints and
Although many professors teach
opportunities of practice.
students to be bound by tradition and doctrine, a few inform
students about their ability to push the boundaries of legal
discourse and encourage students to transform the social injustices
within the legal system. Legal instruction holds the key to
exposing students to post-conventional strategies for changing the
For example, increasingly, legal writing
world of practice.85
specialists consider three promising discourse strategies for
representing outsider clients: (1) using subversive/outsider
Narratives, Therapeutic Narratives: The Invisibility and Omnipresence of Race
and Gender, 95 MICH. L. REV. 901 (1997); Mary Jo Eyster, IntegratingNonSexist/Racist Perspectives into Traditional Course and Clinical Settings, 14 S.
ILL. U. L.J. 471 (1990); Carolyn Grose, A Field Trip to Benetton... and
Beyond: Some Thoughts on "Outsider Narrative" in a Law School Clinic, 4
CLINICAL L. REV. 109 (1997); John B. Mitchell, Narrative and Client-Centered
Representation:What Is a True Believer to Do When His Two FavoriteTheories
Collide?, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 85 (1999); Kimberly E. O'Leary, Using "Difference
Analysis" to Teach Problem-Solving, 4 CLINICAL L. REV. 6, 96-97 (1997); Bill
Ong Hing, Raising Personal Identification Issues of Class, Race, Ethnicity,
Gender, Sexual Orientation, Physical Disability, and Age in Lawyering
Courses, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1807 (1993); Peter M. Shane, Why Are So Many
People So Unhappy?: Habits of Thought and Resistance to Diversity in Legal
Education, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1033 (1990). For the argument that race should
be the core curricular focus in legal education, see generally Frances Lee
Ansley, Race and the Core Curriculum in Legal Education, 79 CAL. L. REV.
1511 (1991).
82. Grose, supra note 81, at 109.
83. Calleros, supra note 32, at 160; Crenshaw, supra note 32, at 6-7
(describing an expectation of minority "testifying" that pose barriers to
participation in the classroom).
84. See Calleros, supra note 32, at 156-58 (discussing the problem of
stereotyping); Mertz et al., supra note 24, at 80-86 (discussing contextual
variables).
85. Baker, Transforming the TraditionalRepertoire, supra note 37, at 52535. Calleros and Pratt have documented circumstances where legal writers
brought outsider claims to legal decision-makers. Calleros, supra note 32, at
152; Pratt, supra note 37, at 82-97.

The John Marshall Law Review

[34:131

narrative;86 (2) detecting, confronting, and avoiding appeals to
bias;87 and (3) utilizing a more nuanced, less adversarial, less
legalistic, and more feminist dialogue." More recently, I proposed
that we not only teach issues of professional responsibility more
pervasively, but also project an ethic of increased client control
and a more transformative ethic of client empowerment for
outsider clients in our legal writing pedagogy. 9 Legal writers
86. Baker, Transforming the Traditional Repertoire, supra note 37, at 524-

38; Teresa Godwin Phelps, Narratives of Disobedience: Breaking/Changing
the Law, 40 J. LEGAL EDUC. 133 (1990); cf. Mitchell, supra note 81, at 85-97
(discussing use of client narrative in the clinical context). Stanchi notes that
legal writing pedagogy already relies strongly on a more narrative
jurisprudence because we require students to write narrative fact sections for
their memos and brief. However, she also criticizes the conservative impulse
of our teaching and criticizes the narratives law routinely produces; she too
proposes more reliance on disruptive outsider narratives. See Kathryn M.
Stanchi, Exploring the Law of Legal Teaching: A Feminist Process, 34 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 193, 197-202 (2000). Reliance on outsider narrative to
persuade legal decision makers, particularly as propounded by the Theoretics
of Practice movement, has been soundly critiqued by Professor Mansfield. She
argues that clients come to lawyers to solve legal problems and therefore they
need legal expertise, not sympathy, not romanticizing, not bedside stories.
Otherwise, the legal field is left open to opposing attorneys and judges who
will control the impact of clients' authentic stories in their world. See
generally Cathy Lesser Mansfield, DeconstructingReconstructive Poverty Law:
Practiced-Based Critique of the Storytelling Aspects of the Theoretics of
Practice Movement, 61 BROOKLYN L. REV. 889 (1995). Mitchell has proposed
reliance on expert witnesses as a way to introduce cultural information that
legitimates client's otherwise unfamiliar or implausible stories. Mitchell,
supra note 81, at 120-24.
87. Baker, Transforming the TraditionalRepertoire, supra note 37, at 53852. Although I acknowledge the ubiquity of bias and stereotype in my
analysis, I am optimistic that we can and should produce less biased texts,
texts that rely less on harmful social stereotypes. Id. Professor Baron is
deeply skeptical that legal language in general and legal narratives in
particular can avoid the cultural/cognitive field where stereotypes abound.
See Baron, supra note 45, at 5-6. "We may be able to acknowledge the
presuppositions with which we make our inquiries, but we cannot do without
them altogether, so our new notions-of women, of others who are demarked
as 'different'-will in this sense be but new alternative stereotypes." Id. at 6;
accord Judith Olans Brown et al., The Mythogenesis of Gender: Judicial
Images of Women in Paid and Unpaid Labor, 6 U.C.L.A. WOMEN'S L.J. 457,
538-39 (1996).

88. Baker, Transforming the TraditionalRepertoire, supra note 37, at 55260. Stanchi calls her entire project an effort to create a more feminist
discourse, one that can include emotion and narrative as well as doctrine.
Stanchi, supra note 82. Austin makes a related point when she urges use of
ethnographies as part of the repertoire of lawyers seeking to challenge underexamined forms of oppression. See Austin, supra note 44.
89. Brook K. Baker, TraditionalIssues of ProfessionalResponsibility and a
Transformative Ethic of Client Empowerment for Legal Discourse, 34 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 809, 857-904 (2000). See also Parker, supra note 37, at 592-94
(discussing the desirability of using legal writing to let the client "represent"
herself).
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must not only be willing to give up near term control over their
texts, they must also engage in contextualized and contested moral
dialogue with clients about the social justice aims of
representation. 9°
After reaching the necessary degree of
agreement, future lawyers must learn how to understand,
collaboratively reconstruct, and then amplify the client's voice in a
way that produces intra-psychic and communal rewards for the
client and her community, and the redistribution of social goods.
All of these client-centered reforms in legal writing necessitate the
inclusion of clients, real or simulated, into the legal writing
classroom. More importantly, these reforms would put social
justice concerns at the center of legal instruction rather than at
the margin.
II.

ANTHROPOLOGICAL PLURALISM IN OTHER SKILLS TRAINING

Fortunately, the legal skills curriculum extends far beyond
the legal writing classroom. Many of these contexts offer even
richer alternatives to the doctrinal classroom. Law clinics, for
example, offer a greater range of interpersonal and situational
sensitivities and skills and provide for more informed critique of
legal rules and the legal system.
In the law clinic, an
anthropologist would hear far less about legal doctrine and far
more about narrative accounts of injustice, 91 the service needs of
poor clients,92 the importance and indeterminacy of facts,93 and the
bureaucratic structures of power." Although doctrinal analysis
90. For a discussion of how this ethic of outsider empowerment is
contextualized within systems of power, impulses to autonomy, and
imperatives of culture, see generally Baker, supra note 89.
91. See, e.g., Clark D. Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients: Thinking about
Law as Language, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2459 (1989); Richard Delgado,
Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 2411 (1989); Patrick Ewick & Susan S. Silbey, Subversive Stories and
Hegemonic Tales: Toward a Sociology of Narrative, 29 L. & SOC'Y REV. 197
(1995); Christopher P. Gilkerson, Poverty Law Narratives: The Critical
Practice and Theory of Receiving and Translating Client Stories, 43 HASTINGS
L.J. 861 (1992); Mitchell, supra note 81; Richard Sherwin, Law Frames:
Historical Truth and Narrative Necessity in a Criminal Case, 47 STAN. L. REV.
39 (1994).
92. See David Fagelson, Rights and Duties: The Ethical Obligation to Serve
the Poor, 17 LAW & INEQ. J. 171 (1999).
93. See, e.g., DAVID BINDER & PAUL BERGMAN, FACT INVESTIGATION: FROM
HYPOTHESIS TO PROOF (1984); William Twining, Taking Facts Seriously, 34 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 22 (1984); Ian Weinstein, Facts: The Mysterious Other Half of
Thinking Like a Lawyer (1997) (on file with author); Walter Weyrauch, Fact
Consciousness, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 263 (1996).
94. See, e.g., Gary Blasi, What's Theory For?: Notes on Reconstructing
Poverty Law Scholarship, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1063, 1069-80 (1994)
(discussing theories of capital flight, bureaucratic disentitlement, and
postmodern critical theory in application to proposals for a model
"homelessness" camp in Los Angeles).

The John Marshall Law Review

[34:131

and legal argumentation play an important role in clinical
practice, a much broader array of skills like interviewing,
counseling, fact-gathering, case planning, and negotiating
supplant more traditional, doctrinal focus. Since many clinicians
encourage critiques of the dominant legal order and since students
have ample opportunity to view the underbelly of the law, clinical
contexts afford rich opportunities for professors and students to
question-and actively resist-legal norms on behalf of outsider
clients. 95 Similarly, externships provide a slightly less structured
but nonetheless interactive opportunity for students to engage in
real lawyering activity.
Externships create more practical
contexts for self-directed learning, a form of learning and
empowerment absent in most doctrinal classrooms. 96 Externships
are laboratories where experience is text97 and task-focused
language forms matter, sometimes positively sometimes
negatively.98 Although some critics conceptualize externships as a
place of unreflective and uncritical absorption of substandard and
unethical norms of practice, 99 externships are also sites where
students can learn to reflect critically, not just on their own work,
but also on systematic defects in the legal culture.0 0

95. "Seeing, participating in, and, most importantly, reflecting upon the law
in action provides the student with an opportunity for engaging in selfconscious critical analysis of legal institutions, rules, and procedures that is
rooted in, yet transcends, the student's own experience." Ann Shalleck,
Clinical Contexts: Theory and Practice in Law and Supervision, 21 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 109, 140 (1993-1994). See, e.g., Jane Harris Aiken,
Striving to Teach "Justice, Fairness, and Morality," 4 CLINICAL L. REV. 1
(1997) (discussing the role of clinics in revealing and opposing systems of
oppression); Calleros, supra note 32, at 147-49; Jon Dubin, ClinicalDesign for
Social Justice Imperatives, 51 SMU L. REV. 1461 (1998); Fran Quigley, Seizing
the Disorienting Moment: Adult Learning Theory and the Teaching of Social
Justice in Law School Clinics, 2 CLINICAL L. REV. 37, 60-61 (1995).
96. See Brook K. Baker, "Self-Directed" Learning Post-Modernized:
Autonomy, the Search for Self, and Self-Realization in Law Student Work
Experience, 4-16 (1997) (unpublished manuscript on file with author); Stephen
Maher, The Praiseof Folly: A Defense of PracticeSupervision in ClinicalLegal
Education, 69 NEB. L. REV. 537 (1990) (focusing on student-centered learning
and self-directedness); Janet Motley, Self-Directed Learning and the Out-ofHouse Placement, 19 N.M. L. REV. 211 (1989); Robert F. Seibel & Linda H.
Morton, Field Placement Programs: Practices, Problems and Possibilities, 2
CLINICAL L. REV.413, 419-20 (1996).
97. Peter Jaszi et al., Experience as Text: The History of Externship
Pedagogy at the Washington College of Law, American University, 5 CLINICAL
L. REV. 403, 404-05 (1999).
98. See Robert Condlin, Learning from Colleagues: A Case Study of the
Relationship Between "Academic" and "Ecological"Clinical Legal Education, 3
CLINICAL L. REV. 337 (1997).
99. See, e.g., Lawrence K. Hellman, The Effect of Law Office Work on the
Formation of Law Students' Professional Values: Observation, Explanation,
Optimization, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 537 (1991).
100. See, e.g., Robert Condlin, "Tastes Great, Less Filling": The Law School
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Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) skills courses also hold
promise in countering the hegemony of doctrinal language and
legalistic perspectives. Although some commentators urge that
law should play a larger part in legal negotiations,"' other
commentators champion integrative or interest-based negotiation
and mediation precisely because they open the fabric of legal
disputes to include other human and contextual factors that may
be more important to fair or just outcomes than "law" alone."'
Clients and lawyers in negotiations can disclose information and
calibrate goals to reach ends not otherwise attainable in court.
More significantly, in mediation and in other party-friendly
procedures, clients can directly participate in resolving what
might otherwise be a legalistic dispute handled by lawyers who
might silence and control them."3 Law students working in ADR
contexts learn a broader array of interpersonal and process skills,
and the students ordinarily remain closer to the human beings
actually embroiled in conflict.' Thus, with ADR, client stories can
count, hurt feelings can count, and private senses of justice can
prevail.
In addition to clinics and ADR programs, the legal skills
curriculum offers additional courses that put law in cultural
context and directly address the social justice concerns capable of
Clinic and Political Critique, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 45 (1986) (arguing that
externships are a superior forum for critiquing the legal system); J.P. Ogilvy,
The Use of Journals in Legal Education: A Tool for Reflection, 3 CLINICAL L.
REV. 55 (1996); Harriet N. Katz, Using Faculty Tutorials to Foster Externship
Students' CriticalReflection, 5 CLINICAL L. REV. 437 (1999); Seibel & Morton,
supra note 96, at 420.
101. See, e.g., Robert J. Condlin, "Cases on Both Sides": Patternsof Argument
in Legal Dispute-Negotiation,44 MD. L. REV. 65, 84 (1985).
102. See, e.g., ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES:
NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (1981); Carrie MenkelMeadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem
Solving, 31 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 754 (1984); see also James M. Cooper, Toward a
New Architecture: Creative Problem-Solving and the Evolution of Law, 34 CAL.
W. L. REV. 297 (1998) (discussing a new paradigm of creative problem-solving
that uses integrative bargaining and other planning and dispute resolution
methodologies to heal and strengthen social bonds of multiple stakeholders);
Janeen Kerper, Creative Problem Solving vs. the Case Method: A Marvelous
Adventure in Which Winnie-the-Pooh Meets Mrs. Palsgraf,34 CAL. W. L. REV.
351 (1998) (arguing that not all problems require "legal" solutions).
103. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Hyman, Slip-Sliding Into Mediation: Can
Lawyers Mediate Their Clients' Problems?, 5 CLINICAL L. REV. 47, 55-63 (1998)
(discussing multiple ways that mediation can help clients).
104. See James H. Stark, Preliminary Reflections on the Establishment of a
Mediation Clinic, 2 CLINICAL L. REV. 457, 476-97 (1996) (addressing some of
the non-traditional skills that students learn in mediation clinics); Kathy
Kirk, Mediation Training: What's the Point, Are the Tricks Really New, and
Can an Old Dog Learn?, 37 WASHBURN L.J. 637 (1998) (discussing
interpersonal skills learned through interactive/interpersonal mediation
training methodologies).
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animating the law. For example, my law school, Northeastern,
has a mandatory first-year course called Law, Culture, and
Difference, which tries to acknowledge how law structures society
and, conversely, how culture impacts law. We pay particular
attention to the systems of oppression-racism, sexism,
homophobia, class elitism, etc.-that plague our society. After
discussing and role-playing topical issues like welfare reform,
hate-speech codes, and the commercialization of human body
parts, students work in lawyering teams to provide direct
representation for community organizations seeking legal change.
The express goal of this course is to impart a public interest/social
justice perspective and introduce lawyering skills in a
multicultural society and within a diverse profession. Other law
schools have similar programs.
Maryland has a first-year
lawyering course that directly exposes students to the
responsibilities of client representation.'°5 Boston College has a
first-year course called Introduction to Lawyering and Professional
Responsibility and NYU has a Lawyering Program, both of which
introduce skills of interviewing, counseling and negotiation within
an ethical framework of traditional rules of professional
responsibility and extra-legal moral perspectives as well. Other
legal writers have identified "more feminist" classrooms where
contextual dialogue and even consciousness-building supplant
doctrinal analysis.1 °6
I am sure that there are many other
examples of courses and/or classrooms where skills teachers
recognize the poverty of doctrine and prioritize contextual,
narrative, and critical perspectives for public and private disputes.

105. Barbara Bezdek et al., Students and Lawyers, Doctrine and
Responsibility:A PedagogicalColloquy, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1107 (1992).
106. See, e.g., Katherine T. Barlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 829 (1990); Patricia A. Cain, Teaching Feminist Legal Theory at Texas:
Listening to Difference and Exploring Connection, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 165
(1988) (describing a feminist pedagogy of trust, listening, sharing, and
relationship); Mary Jo Eyster, Analysis of Sexism in Legal Practice:A Clinical
Approach, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 183 (1988); Ann E. Freedman, Feminist Legal
Method in Action: Challenging Racism, Sexism and Homophobia in Law
School, 24 GA. L. REV. 849 (1990); Melissa Harrison, "A Time of Passionate
Learning:" Using Feminism, Law, and Literature to Create a Learning
Community, 60 TENN. L. REV. 393 (1993); Linda Morton, Creating a
Classroom Component for Field Placement Programs: Enhancing Clinical
Goals with Feminist Pedagogy, 45 ME. L. REV. 19 (1993) (describing a feminist
pedagogy in an externship program); Paul J. Spiegelman, Integrating
Doctrine, Theory, and Practice in the Law School Curriculum: The Logic of
Jake's Ladder and the Context of Amy's Web, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 243 (1988)
(advocating a legal curriculum that employs an ethic of care); Stephanie M.
Wildman, The Classroom Climate: Encouraging Student Involvement, 4
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 326 (1989-1990).
See also e.g., Clare Dalton,
Commentary, Where We Stand: Observations on the Situation of Feminist
Legal Thought, 3 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1988).
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III.

OTHER SITES OF RESISTANCE TO IN"DOCTRINE"ATION

As much as I admire the detail and sophistication of Mertz's
anthropological analysis and her recognition of the mirroring of
legal authoritarianism within legal pedagogy, I worry about how
much her account misses both other sources of self-denial and
alienation for outsider students 7 and the resistance to doctrinal
formalism found at other sites in the law school environment.'08 Of
course, we cannot fault Mertz for choosing a small sample and a
particular type of class to investigate. Mertz focuses her linguistic
and anthropologic lens on an important component of the legal
training environment, a first-year doctrinal, Socratic classroom.
Moreover, there is no doubt that first-year doctrinal classes play a
powerful role in the socialization of law students. However, literal
acceptance of Mertz's thesis might result in despair, a sense that
the power elite has seized the high ground once again and that
their class allies, law professors, patrol the borders of legal
training with an efficacy that rebuffs all insurgency. Although
there is plenty of reason to be pessimistic about the explicit and
implicit messages of legal education, critics, outsiders, and
students must remain optimistic about the individual and
collective cultures of resistance, which oppose the cultural
Moreover, these
momentum of the Socratic classroom.
in"doctrine"ation messages of cultural elitism provide every
incentive to challenge law professors' efforts to exert hegemony
over the meaning of law and the process of professional
acculturation. Without undermining Mertz's thesis, I would like
to supplement it with a short inventory of places and mechanisms
which nurture resistance.
For example, in addition to having classroom and clinical
opportunities, law students nationwide have the ubiquitous
experience of working part-time and during the summers of law
school in law offices, judges' chambers, and government
agencies. 9 Northeastern provides its students with a greatly
107. Outsider students' sense of marginalization does not arise from the
classroom alone. As Margolis and Romero have documented in the sociology
context, students experience a hidden curriculum in the "formal and informal
social structures of graduate programs; financial and mentoring support;
relationships with faculty and other graduate students; research, publishing,
and teaching opportunities." Margolis & Romero, supra note 14, at 5. This
hidden curriculum produces eight forms of marginalization: "stigmatization,

blaming the victim, cooling out, stereotyping, absence, silence, exclusion, and
tracking." Id. at 12.
108. Outsiders always resist their oppression and there are strong reasons to
value this resistance even as we deplore its necessity. See id. at 24-28; bell
hooks, Talking Back: marginality as site of resistance, in OUT THERE:
MARGINALIZATION AND CONTEMPORARY CULTURES 337-43 (Russell Ferguson
et al. eds., 1993).
109. See Daniel J. Givelber et al., Learning Through Work: An Empirical
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expanded opportunity to work in the real world through its cooperative legal education program that alternates four upper-level
academic quarters with four full-time co-op work quarters.
Admittedly, law students working or co-oping often do doctrinal
research and writing, but their work also exposes them to clients,
witnesses, opposing lawyers, and legal decision-makers. Their
social world is rich; their forms of participation varied; and their
dialogic resources decidedly non-doctrinal."' Even though most
students participate in law office experiences only after
socialization to the first-year doctrinal classroom, there is still a
much richer narrative and contextual world in the hurly-burly of
real practice than in the desiccated text of an appellate casebook
and its correlative Socratic classroom.
Similarly, students get out-of-the-classroom exposure to
critical perspectives on the legal system through their public
interest work. Many law schools have instituted voluntary and
mandatory public-interest requirements in which students work
on behalf of economically
disadvantaged
clients
and
communities.'11 At Northeastern, nearly 85% of students fulfill
their public-interest requirement by working full-time for three
months in a public interest placement. Certainly, these pro bono
activities hope to provide a deeper appreciation of the legal needs
of the poor, the legal system's disregard of those needs, and the
profession's increasingly recognized obligation to serve these
constituencies. 112 In addition to these formally organized outside
service opportunities, students-sometimes by themselves and
sometimes with faculty-engage in a bewildering array of
volunteer activities. Such activities at Northeastern include: the
Court Watch program where students study criminal charges and
sentences in a local district court for racial disparity; mentoring
programs for teenage girls in a residential placement program and
for high school students attending a special program based on
weapons violations; and the Domestic Violence Project where
students volunteer at local emergency rooms to study the
incidence of partner violence and to triage services for survivors.
Students get broader exposures not only outside of the law
Study of Legal Internship, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 4-7 (1995) (noting
opportunities for law students).
110. Brook K. Baker, Learning to Fish, Fishing to Learn: Guided
Participationin the InterpersonalEcology of Practice, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 1, 823 (1999) (discussing how students learn in the clinical setting).
111. Deborah L. Rhode, Cultures of Commitment: Pro Bono for Lawyers and
Law Students, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2415 (1999).
Rebecca Cochran has

recommended that legal writing programs assist in this effort.

Rebecca A.

Cochran, Legal Research and Writing Programs as Vehicles for Law Student
ProBono Service, 8 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 429 (1999).
112. David Fagelson, Rights and Duties: The Ethical Obligations to Serve the
Poor, 17 LAW & INEQ. J. 171 (1999).
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school but inside as well. Mertz studied only a limited subset of
legal conversations and discursive reactions to legal authority in
the law school environment. In short, her tape recorder missed
many other areas rich in contextual analysis. In the first instance,
students struggle on their own as they engage in a private
dialogue with legal texts in their law libraries and at their desks
at home. In doing so, students elaborate cognitively on text,
interweaving and superimposing their own life experience onto the
template of the author's justificatory account of his or her
decision."' Students talk about cases and their reactions to
classroom discussions in the lunchroom, in the hallways after
class, in study groups, and in the student organizations that are
on-going sites of resistance in the law school. In identity group
environments in particular, students question authority and
critique legal orthodoxy. Several curricular innovations at my law
school, for example, the "Law, Culture and Difference" course
previously discussed and a course on sexuality and the law, are
outgrowths of student activism aimed at opening the legal
classroom to normative values and social perspective other than
the purely doctrinal. During the past year at my law school,
students and faculty-organized panels and other activities that
have dealt with such topics as capital punishment, immigrant
workers' rights, domestic violence, institutional racism at the law
school, tobacco liability, international law and the United Nations'
air raids on Serbia, and grassroots human rights work in the
United States. In addition, we have a standing law school
committee, the Committee Against Institutional Racism, that
addresses structural issues of racism, including those that arise
from neglected issues of race and unresponsiveness to troubling
statements in doctrinal classrooms.
Although we could
marginalize these non-classroom discussions as extra-curricular
and as non-central to the law school culture, if we change our
perspective ever so slightly to focus on the students' experience of
law school, we will see that these non-classroom locales are central
not only to critical discussions about law but as alternative sources
of identity about what it means to be a lawyer.
CONCLUSION

Elizabeth Mertz reveals a normatively impoverished world of
doctrine institutionalized as a formative socialization experience
for first-year law students.
The Socratic "dialogue," as a
pedagogical method, reinforces the centrality of doctrine, as a way
of maximizing the authority of legal rules at the expense of all the
other contextual, narrative, and emotive forces that might animate
113. Baker, Transforming the Traditional Repertoire, supra note 37, at 499-

500.
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just dispute resolution. To complete the hegemony of doctrine,
first-year doctrinal professors push the actual voices and
perspectives of legal outsiders to the margin. Instead of exploring
complexity, pluralism, and power, the doctrinal classroom presents
legal meaning as relatively determinate, neutral in application,
and uncontested. Of course, to the contrary, law is contested; its
doctrinal platitudes, its Olympian objectivity, its self-referential
universality belie a world of resistance and contestation. Although
articulation and application of pluralistic meanings, perspectival
insights, and social complexity is difficult, Mertz urges us to
acknowledge that unity, formal rationality, and unquestioned
authoritativeness come at a cost. In particular, assumptions of
normalcy, normativity, and acquiescence damage and diminish the
claims of the historically disadvantaged and dispossessed.
Full acceptance of legal culture and unquestioning
acquiescence to the status quo of legal language is deeply troubling
in the legal writing and skills curricula as well. As important as
developing facility with doctrine might be for legal professionals,
fulfilling expectations, particularly those of a legal elite like
lawyers, judges, and legislatures, can often lead to careless
reproduction of the existing legal, economic, and political order.
The interests of powerful people and privileged constituencies
underlie the communicative practices and unchallenged worldview of far too many lawyers. Rather than always meeting the
background assumptions of legal decision-makers, the critical
lawyer must, in many instances, disrupt those assumptions. Thus,
through critical discourse," 4 this new breed of critical lawyers
must challenge the substantive and stylistic status quo of
subordination and marginalization through rebellious lawyering." 5
Although Mertz holds our discipline up to the mirror, we
might ask her what anthropology has to offer, especially what it
has to offer normatively with respect to systems of oppression.
Anthropology itself has been roundly criticized for its history of
exoticizing non-Western cultures, 1 6 its allegedly neutral and nonparticipatory stance, its attention to the personal and physical,
and its avoidance of the normative and political. At the same time
that Western anthropology was studying indigenous cultures,
Western imperialism destroyed and colonized those cultures.
Admittedly, much has changed in the anthropological impulse,
particularly its desire to collaborate with and to participate in
local cultures, to offer situated assistance. But we may still
criticize this impulse as being more at the margin than the core.
114. See id. at 538-552 (identifying critical discourse strategies).
115. See, e.g., GERALD P. LOPEZ, THE REBELLIOUS IDEA OF LAWYERING
AGAINST SUBORDINATION (1992); Lucie White, "Democracy" in Development
Practice:Essays on a Fugitive Theme, 64 TENN. L. REV. 1073 (1997).
116. See generally EDWARD W. SAID, ORIENTALISM (Vintage Books 1979).
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So our question to Mertz might well be: "Does your discipline offer
anything but a critical perspective on our own? Has anthropology
in general, or linguistic anthropology in particular, mapped the
language forms of moral discourse that increase participation,
broaden perspectives, and motivate social justice?"
Legal education, in general, and skills pedagogy, in
particular, like everything else, needs a critical edge in a world of
inequality.
Although legal texts frequently reproduce-and
classroom practices often perpetuate-the existing legal order and
power structure of the world around us, we must remember that
the law alone does not mediate power. In fighting racism and
other systems of oppression, many of us in the legal educational
system are trying to find a human facility or disciplinary
orientation that provides reliable guidance. Yet, on some level,
everything fails us-cognition fails us, individual and group
psychology fails us, law and public policy fail us, emotion fails us,
and now anthropology fails us as well. This does not suggest that
we abandon Mertz's suggestion that we open legal language and
the process of acculturation to a broader range of human
perspectives. Nor does it suggest that we loosen the false hold of
unquestioned authority. Instead, we must continuously strive to
create a multifaceted system of legal education that is responsive
to the dynamics of social justice. We must continue to struggle to
find principles of law, forms of reasoning, and varieties of legal
discourse that might assist the transformation of the world.

